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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0054-1 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 13:09, 25 June 2024

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Naive audience and communication bias
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    Naive audience and communication bias (English)
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    26 January 2007
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    Strategic information transmission
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    Bounded support
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