Paths to stability for matching markets with couples (Q864893): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Importer (talk | contribs)
Created a new Item
 
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
 
(3 intermediate revisions by 3 users not shown)
Property / MaRDI profile type
 
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2145015113 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Random paths to stability in the roommate problem / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Stable matchings and preferences of couples / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: On randomized matching mechanisms / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: NP-complete stable matching problems / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching / rank
 
Normal rank
links / mardi / namelinks / mardi / name
 

Latest revision as of 14:15, 25 June 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
scientific article

    Statements