First-order Gödel logics (Q2370370): Difference between revisions

First-order Gödel logics are natural extensions of the propositional logics introduced by \textit{K. Gödel} [``Zum intuitionistischen Aussagenkalkül'', Erg. Math. Kolloq. Wien 4, 40 (1933; JFM 59.0866.02); reprinted in \textit{Kurt Gödel}, Collected works, Volume I. New York: Oxford University Press (1986; Zbl 0592.01035)] and \textit{M. Dummett} [J. Symb. Log. 24, 97--106 (1959; Zbl 0089.24307)]. They are a family of finite- or infinite-valued logics where the sets of truth values \(V\) are closed subsets of [0,1] containing both 0 and 1. Different such sets \(V\) in general determine different Gödel logics \(G_V\) (sets of those formulas which evaluate to 1 in every interpretation into \(V\)). The paper starts with a preliminary discussion of the syntax and semantics of Gödel logics. Some relevant results regarding the topology of truth-value sets are presented. The main results are that a logic based on a truth value set \(V\) (\(G_V\)) is axiomatizable if and only if \(V\) is finite, or \(V\) is uncountable and 0 is contained in the perfect kernel, or \(V\) is uncountable with 0 isolated in \(V\). Complete axiomatizations for each of these cases are given. The r.e. prenex, negation-free, and existential fragments of all first-order Gödel logics are also characterized. It is shown that the prenex fragment of a Gödel logic is r.e. if and only if the truth value set is finite or uncountable.