A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments (Q2370509): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 10:37, 26 June 2024

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A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
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    A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments (English)
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    26 June 2007
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    public goods
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    mechanism design
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    interim efficiency
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    incentive compatibility
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    private values
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