Pitfalls in public key cryptosystems based on free partially commutative monoids and groups (Q2371104): Difference between revisions

Public key cryptosystems are usually based on factoring large integers or computing discrete logarithms in suitably represented finite cyclic groups. Two exceptions are the public key schemes proposed by [\textit{P. J. Abisha, D. G. Thomas}, and \textit{K. G. Subramanian}, Progress in cryptology -- INDOCRYPT 2003. Proceedings. Berlin: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 2904, 218--227 (2003; Zbl 1123.94333)], which are based on partially commutative monoids and groups. Pitfalls in these cryptosystems were already considered by [\textit{F. Levy-dit-Vehel} and \textit{Perret}, Progress in cryptology -- INDOCRYPT 2004. Proceedings. Berlin: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 3348, 275--289 (2004; Zbl 1113.94313)], who described some attacks which, despite being exponential on the size of the public alphabet \(\Delta\), could be fast enough to compromise the use of practical \(\Delta\). In this paper, it is shown that encryption schemes based on free partially commutative monoids are vulnerable to suitable \textit{ciphertext only} attacks as well, which is further evidence that such cryptosystems do not offer acceptable security.