A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues (Q2371150): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 11:01, 26 June 2024

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A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
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    A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues (English)
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    29 June 2007
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    two-sided matching
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    college admission problem
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    stability
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    core
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    coalition formation
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    simple matchings
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