Arrovian aggregation for preferences over sets (Q997203): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.01.006 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2041496510 / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Strategy-proof social choice correspondences. / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation / rank
 
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Property / cites work: A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 12:40, 26 June 2024

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Arrovian aggregation for preferences over sets
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    Arrovian aggregation for preferences over sets (English)
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    23 July 2007
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    Arrow's impossibility
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    Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
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    superdictatorial domain
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    social choice hyperfunction
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