Dynamic incentive contracts in multiple penalty systems with no-commitment to tenure-track auditing (Q2642565): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 13:34, 26 June 2024

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Dynamic incentive contracts in multiple penalty systems with no-commitment to tenure-track auditing
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    Dynamic incentive contracts in multiple penalty systems with no-commitment to tenure-track auditing (English)
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    17 August 2007
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    dynamic incentive contract
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    tenure-track auditing
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    penalty schemes
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