On the size and structure of group cooperation (Q996366): Difference between revisions

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+Reputation and dynamic Stackelberg leadership in infinitely repeated games
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+Equilibrium and perfection in discounted supergames
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+Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
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+Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
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+The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
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+Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
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+On the size and structure of group cooperation
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+Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
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+The maximum efficient equilibrium payoff in the repeated prisoners' dilemma.
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+Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
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+Pollution claim settlements under private information
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+On Repeated Games with Complete Information
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+The graph of Prisoners' Dilemma supergame payoffs as a function of the discount factor
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