Distinguishing indeterminate belief from ``risk-averse'' preferences (Q2460185): Difference between revisions
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9119-8 / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 13:04, 27 June 2024
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
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English | Distinguishing indeterminate belief from ``risk-averse'' preferences |
scientific article |
Statements
Distinguishing indeterminate belief from ``risk-averse'' preferences (English)
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14 November 2007
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indeterminate belief
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imprecise probability
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Ellsberg paradox
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risk aversion
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Ellsberg decision model
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expected utility
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