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Property / author: Michel Balinski / rank
 
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2006.06.004 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2015156887 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 14:39, 27 June 2024

scientific article
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English
Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism
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    Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism (English)
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    21 January 2008
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    stable marriage
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    stable assignment
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    ordinal transportation
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    university admissions
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    two-sided market
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    many-to-many matching
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