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Latest revision as of 15:38, 27 June 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Bargaining one-dimensional social choices
scientific article

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    Bargaining one-dimensional social choices (English)
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    11 February 2008
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    bargaining
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    voting
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    qualified majority
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    one-dimensional policies
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    single-peaked preferences
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    public good location
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