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Latest revision as of 09:46, 28 June 2024

scientific article
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The role of externalities and information aggregation in market collapse
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    The role of externalities and information aggregation in market collapse (English)
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    26 May 2008
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    The author shows that if the network's externality effect diminishes too much, then an inefficient market collapse may occur, and the cost of re-entry to the market is too high. Therefore a strategic delay on the exit decision of the agents is analyzed.
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    Social (observational) learning
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    Information aggregation
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    Strategic delay (waiting)
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    Experimentation
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    Coordination avalanche
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    Optimal stopping
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