Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures (Q944257): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 16:12, 28 June 2024
scientific article
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English | Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures |
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Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures (English)
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15 September 2008
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