For how long to tie your hands? Stable relationships in an unstable environment (Q1018033): Difference between revisions

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+Commitment vs. Flexibility
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+Rational Expectations and Policy Credibility Following a Change in Regime
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+Optimal Length of Labor Contracts
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+Temptation and Self-Control
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+A Representation Theorem for "Preference for Flexibility"
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+Reputation and imperfect information
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+Normal rank
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+Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting
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+Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
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+The interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency
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+Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
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+On the Value of Commitment with Asymmetric Information
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