The exact bias of the Banzhaf measure of power when votes are neither equiprobable nor independent (Q1024771): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 16:54, 1 July 2024

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The exact bias of the Banzhaf measure of power when votes are neither equiprobable nor independent
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