Endogenous games and equilibrium adoption of social norms and ethical constraints (Q2389303): Difference between revisions

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+John P. Conley
@@ Property / author: John P. Conley / rank @@
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+MaRDI publication profile
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@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.031
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@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W2053135393
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2053135393 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Screening ethics when honest agents keep their word
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Bilateral commitment
@@ Property / cites work: Bilateral commitment / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A Theory of Endogenous Commitment
@@ Property / cites work: A Theory of Endogenous Commitment / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Efficient non-contractible investments in large economies.
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Social norms, cooperation and inequality
@@ Property / cites work: Social norms, cooperation and inequality / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Evolution of Preferences1
@@ Property / cites work: Evolution of Preferences1 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Social Norms and Community Enforcement
@@ Property / cites work: Social Norms and Community Enforcement / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Fully endogenous mechanism selection on finite outcome sets
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q4004282
@@ Property / cites work: Q4004282 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Equilibrium binding agreements
@@ Property / cites work: Equilibrium binding agreements / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
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