Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule (Q734050): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 02:22, 2 July 2024

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Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
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    Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule (English)
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    19 October 2009
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    coalitional strategy-proofness (CSP)
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    preference profile
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    max-min criterion
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    Pareto rule
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