Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries (Q3184582): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 01:33, 2 July 2024

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Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries
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    Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries (English)
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    21 October 2009
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    environment
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    international agreements
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    dynamic game
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