Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions (Q1039728): Difference between revisions

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Property / author: Isa E. Hafalir / rank
 
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Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.04.004 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2109448922 / rank
 
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Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions
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