The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information (Q1049232): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Import240304020342 (talk | contribs)
Set profile property.
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
 
(One intermediate revision by one other user not shown)
Property / full work available at URL
 
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.06.005 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2041319059 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Agreeing to disagree / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Rationalizable Strategic Behavior / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Iterated strict dominance in general games / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Farsighted coalitional stability / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Coalitions, agreements and efficiency / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q3378952 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Mutually acceptable courses of action / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Multistage Situations / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The supercore for normal-form games / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: An admissible set occurring in various bargaining situations / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Sequential Equilibria / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets, discounting, and Nash bargaining / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q4369423 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: General systems and \(\varphi\)-stable sets --- a formal analysis of socioeconomic environments / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: On the foundation of stability / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Stable equilibrium in beliefs in extensive games with perfect information / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Uncertainty aversion and rationality in games of perfect information / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A model of agreements in strategic form games / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q3576736 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Dominated strategies and common knowledge / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Optimistic stability in games of perfect information / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q3843226 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q5844986 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Coalitional stability under perfect foresight / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 09:06, 2 July 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information
scientific article

    Statements

    The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    8 January 2010
    0 references
    extensive games
    0 references
    stable sets
    0 references
    rationality
    0 references
    common knowledge
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references

    Identifiers