Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market (Q2267527): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.11.005
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+W3124634894
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+Farsighted coalitional stability
@@ Property / cites work: Farsighted coalitional stability / rank @@
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+Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
@@ Property / cites work: Random paths to stability in the roommate problem / rank @@
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+An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
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+Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
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+Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
@@ Property / cites work: Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching / rank @@
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+On cores and indivisibility
@@ Property / cites work: On cores and indivisibility / rank @@
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+An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the housing market of Shapley and Scarf
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+Q5821521
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+A note on the strong core of a market with indivisible goods
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