Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement (Q976769): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 22:50, 2 July 2024

scientific article
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Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement
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    Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement (English)
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    16 June 2010
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    costly state verification
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    debt contract
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    priority violation
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    strategic defaults
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