Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement (Q976769): Difference between revisions

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+Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
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+Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
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+A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions
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+Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example
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+Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
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+Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
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+Repudiation and Renegotiation: The Case of Sovereign Debt
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+Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information
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+Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt
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+Optimal multilateral contracts
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+Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
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+Bankruptcy and firm finance
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+Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
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