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Latest revision as of 00:44, 3 July 2024

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Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence
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    Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence (English)
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    8 July 2010
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    voting
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    non-cooperative bargaining
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    power indices
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    experiments
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