Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games (Q980977): Difference between revisions

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Property / cites work: Stackelberg versus Cournot equilibrium / rank
 
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Property / cites work: DEMAND-INDUCED ENDOGENOUS PRICE LEADERSHIP / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Price Leadership / rank
 
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Property / cites work: First Mover and Second Mover Advantages / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Q4902563 / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Endogenous Stackelberg leadership / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 00:44, 3 July 2024

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Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games
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    Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games (English)
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    8 July 2010
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    Cournot
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    duopoly game
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    endogenous timing
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    follower
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    leader
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    Stackelberg
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    strategic complements
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    strategic substitutes
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