An impossibility theorem for matching problems (Q989977): Difference between revisions

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+W2137858222
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+Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
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+Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems.
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
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+Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
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+Nash implementation of matching rules
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+Normal rank
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+Implementation of college admission rules
@@ Property / cites work: Implementation of college admission rules / rank @@
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+Q3999327
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+Normal rank
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+Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
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+Normal rank