Type two computability of social choice functions and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem in an infinite society (Q990505): Difference between revisions

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+Stability of Aggregation Procedures, Ultrafilters, and Simple Games
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+Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
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+Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
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+Stability of social choices in infinitely large societies
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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