On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules (Q993505): Difference between revisions

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Property / author: Vincent R. Merlin / rank
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-009-9187-6 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 06:19, 3 July 2024

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On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules
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    On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules (English)
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    20 September 2010
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    self-selectivity
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    stability
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    instability
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    scoring rules
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    impartial culture assumption
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