Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information (Q617676): Difference between revisions

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+Correlated types and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with budget balance
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+Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm
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+Storable votes
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+An experimental study of storable votes
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+A note on Matsushima's regularity condition
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+Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
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+Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
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+Group decision-making in the shadow of disagreement
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+Q3236243
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+Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence
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+Q2816007
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+Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case
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+Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
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+Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability
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+Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion
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+Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance
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+Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
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