Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model (Q629322): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 20:59, 3 July 2024

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Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model
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    Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model (English)
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    9 March 2011
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    dynamic contract
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    equilibrium termination
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    labor market
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