Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers (Q533083): Difference between revisions

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Property / author
 
Property / author: Sumit K. Garg / rank
 
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID
 
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28 / rank
 
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID
 
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10 / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH DE Number
 
Property / zbMATH DE Number: 5882916 / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
communication
Property / zbMATH Keywords: communication / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
honest senders
Property / zbMATH Keywords: honest senders / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
naive receivers
Property / zbMATH Keywords: naive receivers / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
sender exaggeration
Property / zbMATH Keywords: sender exaggeration / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
receiver skepticism
Property / zbMATH Keywords: receiver skepticism / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
clustering of messages
Property / zbMATH Keywords: clustering of messages / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
non-monotone receiver reaction
Property / zbMATH Keywords: non-monotone receiver reaction / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
finite message space
Property / zbMATH Keywords: finite message space / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
existence
Property / zbMATH Keywords: existence / rank
 
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Property / Wikidata QID
 
Property / Wikidata QID: Q109043122 / rank
 
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Property / MaRDI profile type
 
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
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Property / full work available at URL
 
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.08.001 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W3124461994 / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
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links / mardi / namelinks / mardi / name
 

Latest revision as of 00:48, 4 July 2024

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Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
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    Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers (English)
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    2 May 2011
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    communication
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    honest senders
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    naive receivers
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    sender exaggeration
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    receiver skepticism
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    clustering of messages
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    non-monotone receiver reaction
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    finite message space
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    existence
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