Median stable matching for markets with wages (Q533097): Difference between revisions

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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID
 
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68 / rank
 
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40 / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH DE Number: 5882924 / rank
 
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assignment game
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core
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labor market
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market design
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.12.004 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 00:48, 4 July 2024

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Median stable matching for markets with wages
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    Median stable matching for markets with wages (English)
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    2 May 2011
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    assignment game
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    core
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    labor market
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    market design
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