Analysis and design of selection committees: a game theoretic secretary problem (Q532681): Difference between revisions

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Property / author: Steven Alpern / rank
 
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0159-4 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W1977244024 / rank
 
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Analysis and design of selection committees: a game theoretic secretary problem
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