Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions (Q533941): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Import240304020342 (talk | contribs)
Set profile property.
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
(One intermediate revision by one other user not shown)
Property / full work available at URL
 
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.12.004 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W1974665451 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Continuity of the first price auction Nash equilibrium correspondence. / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting / rank
 
Normal rank

Revision as of 00:25, 4 July 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions
scientific article

    Statements

    Identifiers