Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions (Q533941): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / author @@
-Harrison H. C. Cheng
@@ Property / author: Harrison H. C. Cheng / rank @@
-Normal rank
@@ Property / author @@
+Harrison H. C. Cheng
@@ Property / author: Harrison H. C. Cheng / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type @@
+MaRDI publication profile
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.12.004
+Normal rank
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W1974665451
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W1974665451 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions
@@ Property / cites work: Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Continuity of the first price auction Nash equilibrium correspondence.
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting
@@ Property / cites work: Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ links / mardi / name / links / mardi / name @@
+Publication:533941