Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems (Q543619): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 05:05, 4 July 2024

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Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems
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    Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems (English)
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    17 June 2011
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    multiagent systems
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    scoring rules
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    auction theory
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    mechanism design
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