Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees (Q550195): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 06:07, 4 July 2024

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Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees
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    Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees (English)
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    8 July 2011
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    information aggregation
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    voting
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    asymmetric information
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    swing voter's curse
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