Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders (Q550207): Difference between revisions

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Property / cites work: The package assignment model. / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Core-selecting package auctions / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 06:08, 4 July 2024

scientific article
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Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders
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    Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders (English)
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    8 July 2011
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    package auction
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    core-selecting auction
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    ascending proxy auction
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    single-minded bidder
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