Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders (Q550207): Difference between revisions
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| Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.11.003 / rank | |||
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| Property / OpenAlex ID: W2017295041 / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: The package assignment model. / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: Core-selecting package auctions / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 06:08, 4 July 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders |
scientific article |
Statements
Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders (English)
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8 July 2011
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package auction
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core-selecting auction
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ascending proxy auction
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single-minded bidder
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