On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality (Q639892): Difference between revisions

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-https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0540-3
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-W3122438853
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+https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0540-3
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+On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
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