A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies (Q654531): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 19:45, 4 July 2024

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A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies
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    A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies (English)
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    28 December 2011
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    mechanism design
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    exact and approximate implementation
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    iteratively undominated strategies
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    restricted deception-proofness
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    incentive compatibility
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    measurability
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