On the consistency of deferred acceptance when priorities are acceptant substitutable (Q656783): Difference between revisions

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Property / cites work: Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Axioms for Deferred Acceptance / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 19:46, 4 July 2024

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On the consistency of deferred acceptance when priorities are acceptant substitutable
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    On the consistency of deferred acceptance when priorities are acceptant substitutable (English)
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    13 January 2012
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