On the consistency of deferred acceptance when priorities are acceptant substitutable (Q656783): Difference between revisions
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Property / cites work: Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Axioms for Deferred Acceptance / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 19:46, 4 July 2024
scientific article
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English | On the consistency of deferred acceptance when priorities are acceptant substitutable |
scientific article |
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On the consistency of deferred acceptance when priorities are acceptant substitutable (English)
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13 January 2012
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