Public goods games with reward in finite populations (Q659001): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00285-010-0363-7 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 21:08, 4 July 2024

scientific article
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Public goods games with reward in finite populations
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    Public goods games with reward in finite populations (English)
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    9 February 2012
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    Evolutionary game theory
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    Social dilemmas
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    Cooperation
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    Stochastic dynamics
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