Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types (Q665452): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 23:48, 4 July 2024

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Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types
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    Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types (English)
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    5 March 2012
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    auction
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    ex ante investment
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    full surplus extraction
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    correlation
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    mechanism design
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