Restricted feedback in long term relationships (Q665454): Difference between revisions

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+W2166973609
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+Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
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+Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
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+Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
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+Q5386174
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+International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation
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+Repeated games with one-memory
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+Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems
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+Q5807222
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+Repeated games with present-biased preferences
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+Dynamic games with hidden actions and hidden states
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+Finite memory and imperfect monitoring
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+A theory of regular Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games: Genericity, stability, and purification
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+Sustainable reputations with rating systems
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+Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
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+Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
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+Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for Empirical Work
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+A recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence
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+Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
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+Repeated Games with Frequent Signals<sup>*</sup>
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+How Robust Is the Folk Theorem?<sup>*</sup>
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+Computing Supergame Equilibria
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+Limited records and reputation bubbles
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+Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
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+Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring
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+Recall and private monitoring
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+Sequential Equilibria in a Ramsey Tax Model
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+A Minority Game with Bounded Recall
@@ Property / cites work: A Minority Game with Bounded Recall / rank @@
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+Q5638112
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+On the computation of value correspondences for dynamic games
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+Q4002751
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+Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets
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