Interactions between investment timing and management effort under asymmetric information: costs and benefits of privatized firms (Q420892): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 06:58, 5 July 2024

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Interactions between investment timing and management effort under asymmetric information: costs and benefits of privatized firms
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    Interactions between investment timing and management effort under asymmetric information: costs and benefits of privatized firms (English)
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    23 May 2012
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    investment timing
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    agency
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    incentives
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    privatization
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