An extreme point characterization of random strategy-proof social choice functions: the two alternative case (Q433712): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.11.008
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+W2055903327
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+Voting by Committees
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+Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
@@ Property / cites work: Collective choice under dichotomous preferences / rank @@
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+Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result / rank @@
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+Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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