Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives (Q433814): Difference between revisions

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+Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
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+Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
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+Voting by Committees
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+Arrow and Gibbard--Satterthwaite revisited. Extended domains and shorter proofs
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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+Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
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+On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
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+Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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