Seller competition by mechanism design (Q453209): Difference between revisions

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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26 / rank
 
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID
 
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80 / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6083836 / rank
 
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seller competition
Property / zbMATH Keywords: seller competition / rank
 
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endogenous entry
Property / zbMATH Keywords: endogenous entry / rank
 
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auctions
Property / zbMATH Keywords: auctions / rank
 
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0597-z / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2136254210 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 17:27, 5 July 2024

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Seller competition by mechanism design
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    Seller competition by mechanism design (English)
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    18 September 2012
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    seller competition
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    endogenous entry
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    auctions
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