Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact (Q2276558): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.003 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 20:00, 5 July 2024

scientific article
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Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact
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    Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact (English)
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    6 November 2012
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    multimarket contact
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    infinitely repeated games
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    imperfect public monitoring
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